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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
UTAH STATE ROAD COMMISSION, ) 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ( 
v . ) RESPONDENTS BRIEF 
CARLOS JOHNSON and RUTH L. JOHNSON, ( Case No. 14225 
his wife; FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, , 
N.A.; IDEAL NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE ) 
COMPANY, 
( 
Defendant -Respondents. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
"Tr. " refers to Transcript of Record, "R" refers to 
Record, "STR" refers to Supplemental Transcript of Record and "Ex1' 
stands for Exhibit. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action in eminent domain, instituted by the 
State Road Commission to condemn Respondents' property for highway 
development. The sole issue was a determination of the amount of 
just compensation to be paid for the total taking of Respondents' 
property. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
At the conclusion of jury trial, a Judgment on the Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
verdict was entered in favor of Respondents for $95,000,00 (R. 97-99). 
Appellant thereafter filed a Motion for a New Trial which the trial court 
granted "unless, within ten days, the Defendants filed a consent to a 
reduction of the damages down to the highest figure placed thereon by 
the expert testimony. Their own expert, Memory Cain," to -wit: 
$92,000.00 (STR. 2, 3). 
Respondents filed such a consent (R. 104) and thereafter 
Appellant initiated this appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents ask that the ruling of the trial court relative 
to remittitur and the jury verdict of $92,000.00, based upon said 
remittitur be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In February 1974, the Utah State Road Commission filed 
a Complaint in the District Court of Salt Lake County to condemn a 
parcel of commercial property belonging to the Respondents (R. 1-5). 
The land in question was acquired by the owners in 1954, 
and in the following year (1955) Mr. Johnson constructed a commercial 
building upon the site (Tr. 10, 11). This building was constructed upon 
a 3 foot footings with additional support afforded by 32 pilasters 
-2 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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constructed on a three foot square (Tr. 11). The structure was 50' x 70' 
(3500 square feet), and was of cinder block design, with flat gravel 
roof, fully insulated, copper plumbing, insulated conduit wiring, air 
conditioned, forced air heating and connected to the Magna Sewer and 
Water Service (Tr. 11-15, 67, 80). The inside of the building was 
panelled and partitioned into two major parts. The East 18' x 70' was 
improved, fully equipped and devoted to a cafe operation and the 
remaining portion was likewise fully equipped and devoted to use as a 
private lounge and club (Tr. 14-17) (Exhibits D-2, 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 ) . 
The property having been improved prior to the enactment 
of zoning regulation, gave it a unique quality of commercial use in an 
"agricultural zone A-20". (Tr- 59, 60, 73, 74). 
As a consequence of the condemnation the entire property 
was taken and the case proceeded to trial upon the single issue of just 
compensation to be awarded. 
In the course of the trial the landowner Carlos Johnson, 
testified in detail relative to his intimate knowledge of the construction 
of the building and the use thereof and further testified that he placed a 
market value on the property at the date of taking at $120,000,00, to 
$125,000.00 (Tr. 51, 52, 56). 
Memory Cain, expert appraiser for the landowners, 
testified that he utilized both the "income" and "cost" approaches to 
- 3 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
value , placing his greatest rel iance upon the cost approach, (Tr. 84-89); 
that based upon the income approach to value the fair market value was 
$90,100.00 (Tr. 84), and based upon the cost approach, the property 
had a value of $92 ,000 .00 (Tr. 88, 89) (Exhibits 11-D, 12-D). 
Memory Cain a lso testified that he made a market 
ana lys i s of the real property and uti l ized this as one of the factors in 
arriving at his es t imates of fair market value (Tr. 93). 
The appraiser for the s t a t e , Zane Burgeston, relying 
upon the income approach to value testif ied that the market value was 
$59 ,000 .00 , and based upon the cost approach - $54 ,000 .00 (Tr. 170, 
171). 
The jury returned a verdict of $95 ,000 .00 upon which 
Judgment was entered (Tr. 223) . Thereafter Appellant filed a Motion for 
New Trial , and the trial judge, granted the Motion unless within ten 
days the Defendants consented to a reduction of the damages down to 
$92 ,000 .00 (STR. 2 , 3 ) . The Defendants filed their consent to the 
reduction in conformity with the Court 's ruling (R. 104). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT EXERCISED IMPLICIT AUTHORITY IN 
DIRECTING A REMITTITUR OF $ 3 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 , AND DID 
NOT COMMIT ERROR IN SO DOING. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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The Appellant argues that the Motion for a New Trial 
filed in this action did not invoke the right of the trial judge to grant 
or order a Remittitur, and cites as a basis therefore the provisions of 
Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Respondent takes issue 
with the Appellants' interpretation of said Rule and invites the Court's 
attention to the case of Bodon v. Suhrmann, 8 Utah 2d 42, 327 P.2d 
826, and a long line of authorities cited therein, wherein this Court 
stated: 
n
* * * * there is implicit within the authority of the 
Court to grant a new trial on the statutory ground of 
1
 "excessive or inadequate damages * * *Mf the power 
to order a new trial conditionally: i . e . , to order that 
a new trial be granted unless the party adversely 
affected by the order agrees to a Remittitur or an 
additur of the damages to an amount within proper 
limits as viewed by the Court. A Motion for a New 
Trial based on such ground invokes the exercise^of 
such prerogative of the trial court; and likewise of 
this court on appeal. f l 
"It has long been established that where the award is 
in excess of damages shown by the evidence it will not 
be permitted to stand. In such instances the court's 
exercise their inherent supervisory powers over jury 
verdicts, which derive from their duty to see that 
justice is done: and make corrective orders necessary 
for that purpose. This is done by the trial court, or 
upon its failure to do so, by this court on appeal. " 
(Citing numerous authorities). 
- 5 -
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3 ;: In the Suhrmann case, supra, the Utah Supreme Court 
cites Rule 59 (a) (5) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as supporting 
the rule of law announced hereinabove. 
This Court in a previous decision which has been 
adhered to and followed in a long line of cases stated in Duffy v. 
Union Pac. R.Co. , 118 Utah 82; 218 P.2d 1080, as follows: 
"Section 104 - 40 - 2 (5) Utah Code Annotated 1943, 
provides that a verdict of a jury may be vacated apd 
a new trial granted by the trial judge when damages 
are excessive and appear to have been given under 
the influence of passion and prejudice. Trial courts 
of this land and other states grafted onto that provision 
the right of the trial court to refuse to grant a new trial 
when the damages were excessive, if the winning party 
would consent to a reduction. The provision was thus 
extended by judicial decision to permit trial courts to 
require a remission of part of the damages or suffer the 
consequences of a new trial. This Court placed its 
stamp of approval upon the procedure, and has on many 
occasions indicated that our rights of review are 
limited to a determination of whether the trial judge 
abused his discretion in not granting a new trial unless 
the plaintiff consented to a reduction in the amount of 
the verdict. " 
For additional authority see Hill v. Varner, 4 Utah 2d. 
166, 290 P.2d 448; Fuller v. Mountain Sculpture, 6 Utah 2d 385, 
314 P.2d 842; Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 447, 55 S.Ct. 296; 79 L.Ed, 
603; 95 ALR 1150. 
- 6 -
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Further analysis of the Appellant's brief indicates 
that they do not believe the trial judge can modify the jury verdict 
without, in effect, depriving the Appellant of the right to a trial by 
jury. Along this line this Court in the case of King v. Union Pac. R.Co. , 
212 P.2d 692 (Utah 1949) stated: 
"The defendant urges that if a trial judge is allowed 
to set aside a verdict returned by a jury which is 
supported by substantial competent evidence, there 
results an infringement upon its right to a trial by, 
jury. There is no merit in this contention. The 
Supreme Court of the United States in Capital Traction 
Co. v, Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 19 S.Ct. 580, 585, 43 L.Ed. 
873, amply answered this argument when it said: 
' "Trial by jury, ' in the primary and usual sense of the 
term at the common law and in the American constitutions, 
is not merely a trial by a jury of 12 men before an officer 
vested with authority to cause them to be summoned and 
impaneled, to administer oaths to them and to the 
constable in charge, and to enter judgment and issue 
execution on their verdict; but it is a trial by a jury of 
12 men in the presence and under the superintendence of 
a judge empowered to instruct them on the law and to 
advise them on the facts, and (except on acquittal of a 
criminal charge) to set aside their verdict, if, in his 
opinion, it is against the law of the evidence. " 
In view of the authorities set forth hereinabove we do 
not believe that the trial Court erred in directing a Remittitur of the 
verdict and that the same is amply supported by law as announced by 
this Court and the great weight of authorities. 
- 7 -
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POINT II 
THE VERDICT WAS WITHIN THE RANGE OF CREDIBLE 
EVIDENCE AND SUPPORTED BY THE GREATER WEIGHT 
OF THE EVIDENCE. 
The Record is clear that the subject property was unique 
in that it was an isolated commercial tract located in an agricultural 
zone and on an arterial highway (Tr. 59, 60, 73 , 74) (Ex. P - l ) . 
Both of the expert appraisers relied primarily on the 
"income" and "cost" approach to values supplemented by their general 
knowledge of market data and general experience (Tr. 84, 88) (Tr. 170, 
171). The Record is long and detai led a s to the in t r icacies of each 
appra i sa l . At no time did counsel for the State Road Commission object 
to the testimony of the landowners ' expert w i tnes s , nor did he interpose 
any Motion to Strike such test imony. To the contrary, he conducted 
extensive cross-examinat ion (Tr. 91, 115), thereby giving the jury full 
opportunity to weigh and judge the testimony of this w i t n e s s . 
In addition to the expert real e s t a t e appraiser , the land-
owners presented a general building contractor a s a w i t n e s s , who gave 
testimony relative to the value of the building, improvements and the 
cost of construct ion t which testimony corroborated and supplemented 
the test imonies of the landowner and their expert real e s t a t e appraiser 
(Tr. 117-123). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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The landowner Carlos Johnson, a man 71 years of age, 
testified that he acquired the property in 1954, and personally had a 
building constructed thereon in the following year of 1955 (Tr. 10, 11). 
In his testimony he went into great detail relative to the type of 
construction, the nature and extent of the materials involved and the 
nature and manner of its use and occupancy from the date of its 
construction until taken by the State Road Commission (Tr. 11-61). 
A careful analysis of his testimony will show that he 
was totally familiar and acquainted with each and every aspect of the 
construction, starting with the foundation, and ranging from that point 
to a detailed description of the wiring, plumbing, partitioning, finish 
and furnishings. (Tr. 11-57). Not only was he totally versed and 
acquainted with such aspects of construction, he also testified he had 
operated such businesses for 43 years, and in particular, had been 
actively involved in the operation and/or management of the subject 
building for the past 20 years (Tr. 20-24). 
Mr. Johnson candidly admitted that he did not consider 
himself a real estate salesman or a real estate appraiser and further 
admitted that he was not a licensed building contractor, but he did state 
that he had talked to building contractors and believed that he possessed 
knowledge of the value of his property. (Tr. 56, 57, 58). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Respondents contend that the testimony of the landowner 
was credible and falls within the purview of the case of State Road 
Commission v. Dillree , 25 Utah 2d 184, 478 P.2d 507. In the Dillree 
case we had a factual situation very similar to the case at bar wherein 
the landowner had resided upon the property for many years, was totally 
familiar with the quality of the construction involved and demonstrated 
knowledge relative to the use of the property which he had operated as 
a mink ranch, and in that case this Court sustained a jury verdict 
based in part upon the testimony of the landowner and there announced 
the following rule of law: 
"Mr. Dillree being an owner of the property, together 
with his wife, was a competent witness as to the value 
of the property taken and as to severance damages 
incurred. There is nothing in the record to indicate that 
the award of the jury was influenced by passion, bias or 
prejudice except the single fact that the verdict was in 
excess of the amounts testified to by the expert witnesses• 
That fact alone is insufficient to persuade us that the 
verdict was in fact excessive or that it was tainted by 
passion or prejudice. The verdict and judgment of the 
court below is affirmed. " 
See also: Salt Lake and U.R.P.Co. v. Schramm, 56 Utah 53, 
189 P. 90, 92. 
See also the case of State Highway Commission of Montana 
\r. P ^ r g n n J 328 P.2d 617, where the Supreme Court of that state said: 
-10-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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"Who are competent to give opinions on value of 
property is generally in the discretion of the trial 
judge. It must appear that the witness has some 
peculiar means of forming an intelligent and correct 
judgment as to the value of the property in question 
beyond what is presumed to be possessed by men , 
generally. Lewis, Eminent Domain, § 656, p . 1127 
(3d ed . ) . One who knows the real property in 
question and is familiar with the uses to which it 
may be put, may testify, as to its market value. 
The witness need not know of any sales and he need 
not be a technical expert." (Citing numerous 
authorities). 
Of similar interest is the case of State of New Mexico 
v. Chavez, 80 N.M. 394, 456 P.2d 868, 870 (1969). In adopting the 
rule permitting the testimony of the landowner to support a verdict the 
Supreme Court of that state there stated: 
"Appellant concedes that the prevailing rule permits 
an owner to testify concerning the value of his land 
both before and after a taking by condemnation 
(citing authority). It argues, however, that because 
the rule has been stated as one of practical necessity. 
* * * we should adopt the rule followed by a minority 
of jurisdictions which denies the right of an owner to 
testify concerning the value of his property taken or 
damaged by the soverign through the use of eminent 
domain. * * *" 
This Court has also affirmed the landowner's right to 
testify relative to market value in the case of Provo Water Users 
Association v. Carlson, 103 Utah 93, 133 P.2d 777 (1943). 
-11-
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Similarly, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has upheld the right of 
a property owner to testify concerning the value of property which he 
occupies and opera tes . Telluride Power Co . v . Wil l iams, 164 F.2d 
685 (10th Cir . 1947) : 
In the light of all of the foregoing facts and prevailing 
law the jury had before it an abundance of credible evidence and 
testimony to support the verdict . 
POINT HI 
THE TURY'S AWARD WAS NOT EXCESSIVE AND WAS 
NOT GIVEN UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF PASSION 
OR PREJUDICE. 
The main contention of bias and prejudice asser ted by 
Appel lants , stems from the fact that the verdict was $3 ,000 .00 in 
exces s of the expert testimony of the landowners ' wi tness ; however, 
it should be noted that the verdict was at leas t $27 ,000 .00 l e s s than 
the landowner 's test imony. Although it is the Respondent 's contention 
that the evidence and testimony presented by the landowner was credible 
and was of such a nature and quality that it would support the jury 
verdict , never theless the trial judge saw fit to direct a remittitur which 
was accepted by the Respondent a s an al ternative to accepting a new 
-12-
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trial of the case . For the reasons set forth under Point I, we believe 
that the trial court possessed the inherent power and authority to order 
the Remittitur and in so doing brought the verdict within the purview 
and range of the credible evidence and testimony as viewed by the 
Court. 
Appellant cites as authority the case of State Road 
Commission v. Silliman, 22 Utah 2d 33, 448 P.2d 347 (1968), in support 
of its contention that a new trial should have been granted. In the 
Silliman case the jury verdict was set aside because it was in excess 
of the amount testified to by any witness (including the landowner). 
This Court held the verdict was therefore excessive "as a matter of law." 
The Court noted that, otherwise, the verdict could not be set aside 
unless so excessive as shocking to one's conscience. The Silliman 
case , presented a factual situation entirely different from the case at 
i ssue. 
The rule of law consistently adhered to by this Court on 
the issue of bias and prejudice was reiterated in the case of Stamp v. 
Union Pac. R.Co. , 5 Utah 2d 397, 303 Pac. 2d 279. In that case 
the Court stated: 
-13-
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"This Court in the case of Wheat v. Denver & R.G.W. 
R. C o . , (Utah, 250 P.2d 932), speaking through Mr. 
Justice Crocket said: 
'"We do not doubt that when a verdict is so grossly 
disproportionate to any amount of damages which 
could have fairly been awarded as to make manifest 
that the verdict was so suffused with passion and 
prejudice that the defendant could not have had a 
fair trial on the i ssues , the trial court should 
unconditionally grant a new trial. * * 
"Nothwithstanding what was said therein, we regard 
the true rule to be that if the verdict is so excessive 
as to show that it must have been motivated by 
prejudice or ill will toward a litigant, or that passion 
such as anger, resentment, indignation or some 
kindred emotion has so overcome or distorted the 
jury's reason that the verdict is vindictive, vengeful 
or punitive, it should be unconditionally set aside. "' 
The Court further noted that ". . . W e have held that 
mere excessiveness of the verdict is not 
necessarily the standard for determining prejudice, 
although it might be . " 
See also the case of Alexander v. State (Mont. 1963) 
381 P.2d 780, where that court stated: 
"In eminent domain proceedings, the jury findings will 
generally not be disturbed on appeal unless they are 
so obviously and palpably out of proportion to the 
injury done as to be in excess of just compensation 
provided for by Section 14, Art. Ill, of the Montana 
Constitution. " 
-14-
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One of the aspects of the Dillree case, supra, merits 
repetition on the issue of bias and prejudice. In that case the Court 
said: (Emphasis added) 
11
. . , there is nothing in the record to indicate that 
the award of the jury was influenced by passion, bias 
or prejudice except the single fact that the verdict 
was in excess of the amounts testified to by the expert 
witnesses. That fact alone is insufficient to persuade 
us that the verdict was in fact excessive or that it was 
tainted by passion or prjudice. The verdict and judg-
ment of the court below is affirmed. " 
We believe that the Verdict and Judgment is not such as 
to be shocking to one's conscience and falls within the range of 
abundant credible evidence and testimony. 
CONCLUSION 
Of signal import in this case is the fact that the trial 
judge duly considered the Motion for New Trial and being in an 
advantageous position to have observed the demeanor of the various 
witnesses and ruling upon the evidence throughout the trial, concluded 
that no new trial should be granted if the Remittitur was accepted. 
Appellant in substance, is asking this Court to overrule the factual 
findings and considerations of both the jury and the trial judge. 
-15-
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It is respectfully submitted that the verdict and the 
Judgment on the Verdict as modified by R^^/ ;^>4^should stand. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Brant H. Wall 
Attorney for Respondents 
-16-
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V 
I hereby certify that I delivered two copies of the 
foregoing Respondents' Brief to Vernon B. Romney, Attorney General, 
and Donald B. Coleman, Assistant Attorney General, this 
day of _ , 1976. 
Brant H. Wall 
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